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USAF review
completed.
ARMY review completed.

Department of State
review(s) completed.

DIA review
completed.

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
NSC BRIEFING

11 May 1955

10 MAY AIR INCIDENT

I. US flight of 8 Sabrejets was on daylight patrol (typical of those carried out every few days over Yellow Sea).

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C. A total of 30 ChiCom and NK MIGs

apparently involved. FEAF says 2 MIGs destroyed. 2 probable. No US losses.

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DIA review completed

USAF review completed

Department of State review completed.

ARMY review completed.

II. Reason for enemy decision actually make
attack is unclear.

- A. Probably reflects increased sensitivity
in already sensitive area (flight was
under 50 miles from major Antung air
complex, 100 miles from Port Arthur).
- B. Sensitivity undoubtedly increased by
current Soviet withdrawal from Port
Arthur.
- C. Attack may also reflect enemy belief
US flight had invaded Chinese terri-
torial air adjacent to coastal
islands.


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III. In contrast to usually accurate accounts, Peiping has incorrectly stated location of 10 May attack.

A. Charged that flight intruded over 3 Manchurian islands, was intercepted 3 miles west of Talu island at 11:25.

B. Also incorrectly claimed one intruder destroyed, 2 damaged.



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IV. Following ChiCom attack, our planes engaged in "hot pursuit" with resulting overflight of ChiCom territory. One such penetration went as far as 15 nautical miles inland, to north of Takushan.

STALINGRAD INCIDENT

- I. On 6 May, Embassy Moscow reported that the Stalingrad hotel room occupied by three American assistant army attaches (visiting city on official trip) was "forced by six unidentified Soviet citizens."
 - A. The senior attache reported to Embassy by telephone that incident made it "necessary" for the party to return to Moscow on first available plane (ude in Moscow afternoon 7 May).
- II. Although five days have passed since Embassy reported incident, no further news has been received by Department of State or G-2 working level.
- III. Following rash of "incidents" last year, Ambassador Bohlen emphasized need for "correct behavior"--no picture-taking or note-taking--on part of US officials.

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NSC BRIEFING

11 May 1955

FORMOSA STRAITS

- I. Only Chicom offensive action in past week was firing of 161 arty rounds against Quemoy on 5 May--heaviest fire since 18 December. Situation was otherwise quiet.
- II. Chicom forces not wholly inactive, however.

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IV. Adm Pride and Gen Chase visited Quemoy on 7 May, and Chase reports high morale and improvement there. Some difficulties still noted, however.

- A. Too much effort on permanent construction rather than training.
- B. Time lag in air support from Formosa too great (2 hrs. for jets, 3 for piston types).
- C. Naval support unsatisfactory, as naval commander on Quemoy ignores Quemoy Defense Commander.

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D. Some shortages of ammo, weapons.

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v. Peiping Radio has refrained from comment in past week on topic of Sino-US negotiations.

A. Chicoms have reaffirmed, however, their intention to "liberate" all Nationalist-held territory despite US action and "threats."

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VII. On substantive issues, Peiping has consistently taken hard line.

A. Chicoms argue that there is no need for cease-fire, that status of Formosa is not negotiable, that only matter to negotiate is US withdrawal from China area.

B. This is not necessarily, however, Peiping's final position.

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KONEV, I. S. Marshal SU

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Present position: Deputy Defense Minister; full member, Party Central Committee (since 1946).

Age 58; joined Communist Party 1917; active in party very early; he and wife joined partisans in early 20's; named in doctors' plot Jan. 1953; Chairman of court convicting Beria; lately prominent as military spokesman, praising Khrushchev. During last war, commanded various fronts in reconquest of Ukraine and drive to Berlin (including II and I Ukraine Fronts); participated in Berlin and Prague capture. Commander, Central Group of Forces, Austria-Hungary and member, ACC, Austria, (45-46); Commander in Chief, Ground Forces, 1946-1950 (replaced Zhukov); Inspector General of armed forces (replaced Govorov) 1950-52; Commander, Carpathian MD (1952-55). Between 1946-51 made various inspection tours of satellites.

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12 May 1955

ROKOSSOVSKI, K. K. Marshal SU

Present positions: Minister of National Defense, Poland (since Nov. 1949);
C in C Polish Army; member, Central Committee and Politburo of Polish Communist
Party (PZPR).

Age 59; officer in Imperial Army; joined Communist Party 1918; purged, imprisoned
in 1937; recalled in 1940; important role in Moscow and Stalingrad defense;
Commander, I Belorussian Front which drove into Central Poland; Commander II
Belorussian Front (which occupied E. Prussia); Commander, Northern Group of
Forces, Poland (1945-49).

Described as capable, efficient, great tactical ability; in drive into Poland,

Zhukov kept Rokossovski on right flank and Konev on left flank.

SOVIET DISARMAMENT
PROPOSALS OF 10 MAY

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II. On Tuesday, at the London four-power disarmament talks, just such a proposal was made by Ambassador Malik, in the form of a 5,000 word document which was publicized by Tass yesterday.

A. Malik document apparently represents Soviet views on range of subjects that should come up at any "summit" four-power meet.

B. USSR probably anticipates closing out disarmament talks in London and the transfer of international interest to a four-power meeting on higher level.

Omnibus proposal, packaging mild Soviet concessions on disarmament with adamant opposition to West German rearmament as envisaged in Paris accords, is designed to seize propaganda initiative and present points at issue in terms most advantageous to USSR.

III. A. Statement did not include any substantive changes in Soviet positions on basic political problems in Europe and Asia.

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B. It did, however, introduce several new

features in disarmament plan, some of which were borrowed from British and French proposals at recent London talks and are likely to appeal to West European neutralist and anti-German sentiment.

1. Moscow accepted British and French force levels: US, USSR and Communist China would have from 1 to 1.5 million men each; Britain and France would have 650,000 men each.

2. Moscow also accepted British and French timing of prohibition on nuclear weapons--when 75% of reductions of conventional armaments accomplished.

C. Proposals imply no change in Soviet opposition to sort of international control system which West would consider effective.

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1. However, did suggest setting up international control posts capable of observing "concentrations" of military forces in large ports, at railway junctions, on motor roads and airfields.

D. References to Germany suggest that Moscow may seek to concentrate attention on an approach featuring limitation on armed forces of the two parts of Germany as part of a wider European and global security and arms limitation system.

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SOVIET DIP. OFFENSIVE

1. Greatest Sov. Dip. offensive aimed at:
 - a) Building neutralist bloc - Europe & Asia
 - b) Blocking rearmament
 - c) Attack on USA overseas assets, troops and bases.

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2. Element of offensive (peaceful)

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- b) Cultivation Nehru & play for leadership
Indian industrialization (Tata visit)
 - c) Menon visit Peiping
 - d) Agreement with Iran
 - e) Austrian Treaty
 - f) Disarmament proposal

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This has three main elements:

- a) Accepts - British French land force goals & their timing re nuclear weapons - when 75% other reductions effected.
- b) Suggests withdrawal of all foreign troops "from Territory of Germany to their national frontiers, " except for small contingents.
- c) Proposes dismantling of "foreign military bases. "
- d) New formula on inspection - which tends to befuddle issue.

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Aggressive Tactics - to show not negotiating

from weakness:

- a) Show of new air strength
- b) Forming Eastern NATO (Rumored
Zhukov may head Orbit Joint Command -
Rokossovski to get north regional command -
Poland, East Germany & Czechoslovakia -
and Konev south - Hungary - Rumania -
Bugaria - Albania.)
- c) May be behind Afgan - Pak trouble,
but no evidence.
- d) Last minute Austrian hold up.

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AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

I. At the Moscow conference (April 11-15)

Austria and the Soviet Union agreed to⁹ make a separate agreement on the economic terms of the State Treaty, which would supercede the reparation terms found in Article 35 of draft Treaty.

A. Under new agreement, USSR would liquidate all its economic holdings in Austria.

B. In turn, the Austrians would:

1. Ship 1 million tons of oil a year to the USSR annually for 10 years, in payment for the return of oil property.
2. Pay the equivalent of 150 million dollars in goods, in six equal annual installments, for the immediate return of the estimated 240 industrial and commercial businesses now controlled by Soviet Enterprises in Austria (USTIA).

3. Pay the USSR 2 million dollars
for the return of the Danube
Shipping Company assets in the
Soviet Zone.

II. The Western Powers in current negotiations
are aiming to include the Austro-Soviet
bilateral agreement in the Treaty. This
would be done by:

- A. Substituting Moscow agreement for
Article 35, *or*
- B. Making it an annex to the Treaty,
referred to in Article 35, *or*
- C. Refer^{ring} to the Agreement in Article 35,
in order to include agreement in the
treaty mechanism for the settlement
of disputes over interpretations of the
treaty (Article 57).

III. Essence of dispute is:

- A. The Western powers fear that they have
no means of insuring that the USSR will
abide by the terms of the bilateral
agreement unless some reference such

as those above is made to it in the
treaty itself.

- B. The USSR, however, has steadfastly
refused to make any reference to
the Moscow agreement in the treaty
draft.

WARSAW RUMORS

- I. US Embassy Warsaw relays first rumors regarding Orbit Warsaw Conference, picked up by Western diplomats there.
 - A. Rumors claim that Zhukov will head Orbit Joint Command.
 - B. Bokossovski rumored to get regional command in North (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia).
 - C. Konev to get regional command in South (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania).

SOVIET DRIVE FOR "BUFFER ZONE"

I. Kremlin's fast-moving diplomatic campaign last few months indicates USSR hard at work building "buffer zone" around iron curtain countries, making major effort "neutralize" border states that would ordinarily be pro-Western rather than pro-Soviet.

A. Campaign of "peaceful negotiations" designed disarm West both figuratively and literally--

B. Figuratively, by persuading world that only US (not USSR) preparing for nuclear war, or likely to start one:

C. Literally, by keeping potential allies (like West Germany, Japan) out of Western military coalition.

D. Overall goal--consolidate Soviet postwar gains; simultaneously, insulate these possessions by construction "neutral"

belt.

II. Soviet game same all around bloc, but
timing, tactics vary with local situation.

In Far East:

A. Japan. USSR opening negotiations in
London 1 June to "normalize" diplomatic,
economic relations with Japan.

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B. Korea. North half is longtime Soviet
buffer zone, and despite fact that
South at present too strongly anti-
Communist to win over, ROKs nonetheless
constantly being wooed by N. Korean
propaganda for "peaceful unification."

C. Formosa-Vietnam. ChiComs, apparently
now in line with USSR, talking peace-
fully--though vaguely--of negotiating
on Formosa. Meanwhile, ChiComs and Viet
Minh watchfully wait as Indochina elec-
tion time draws nearer, S. Vietnam con-
tinues in ferment.

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III. In Middle East:

- A. Afghanistan. Afghans don't need Soviet help in [redacted] their feud with Pakistan. But USSR giving Afghanistan loans and technical aid, may also be playing Afghan politicians against one another in present crisis.
- B. Pakistan. Embroilment of Pakistan in Afghan dispute tends to divert nation from anchor role in "northern tier" defense line.
- C. India. USSR has been cultivating Nehru as "spokesman of neutral nations," has invited him to Moscow this June. May have encouraged Nehru to send Krishna Menon, his leading diplomat, to Peiping as a hopeful mediator. India also is main non-Communist recipient of Soviet technical and economic aid.

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- D. Iran. Soviet financial/border deal increases probability Iranian absence from center of "northern tier" for at least next eighteen months.
- E. Arab States. New Soviet twist--pro-Arab, anti-Israeli diplomatic actions, propaganda--seems designed immobilize already neutralist Arab states, keep Syria out of Turk-Iraq treaty--thus undermining "northern tier" anchor-in-making at Western end.

IV. In Europe:

- A. Yugoslavia. USSR continues wooing of Yugos and Tito himself now says he thinks of Yugoslavia as part of eventual cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe.
- B. Austria. "new line" here is most dramatic gesture in whole Soviet European drive to date. After years of stalling on peace treaty, USSR being cheered for promising to:

1. Neutralize Austria (an area not under its control and not of first-rank strategic or political value).
2. Withdraw Soviet occupation forces (which will probably move no farther than frontier, be incorporated in new Soviet-Satellite military command).

C. Germany. This is most crucial salient in worldwide campaign for "buffer zone." If USSR can neutralize all Germany, cost of concessions in Austria will have been ridiculously low.

1. Most likely, USSR plans retain control East Germany, bargain at length with sovereign West Germany on unification.
2. Motive: delay West German contribution to NATO for longest possible time--perhaps long enough for Adenauer to die or for UK, French to grow cool towards big armies, high

D. Scandinavia. At northern end, neutral Sweden--together with Finland--could provide a logical anchor for "buffer zone." Finland would welcome genuine neutrality, in place of present pressures (1947 peace treaty, 1948 Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assistance Agreement).

V. To summarize this look around Bloc perimeter, Soviets are trying to make neutrals of those nations that, if given a free choice, would be pro-Western. In the Soviet view, nations that are already neutral are not expected to stay that way, but instead move closer and closer to Bloc as result of political, economic pressure from Moscow.

A. Soviet leaders probably expect period of "peaceful coexistence"--in light of destructiveness hydrogen warfare--to be prolonged.

B. Like others we could name, Soviet leaders also prefer to negotiate from "position of strength." Thus, USSR's "peaceful" approaches are accompanied by undertone of threat, stress on Soviet military might.

VI. This is not irrational switch from cold to hot and back again, but--instead-- simultaneous approach, with maintenance of military strength at high levels, rapid advances in production of critical hardware (like atomic bombs and jet bombers), as "reverse" of negotiation coin.

A. Bulganin-Khrushchev regime stresses military preparedness to show USSR is not negotiating from weakness--whatever its domestic political and economic problems.

B. This accounts for Soviet military budget boost, parading of new bombers over Moscow, fanfare and ceremony in Berlin-Prague-Warsaw over setting up unified Soviet-Satellite military command.

C. In this connection, increase in orthodox Soviet-Marxist dogma, noted in recent months, is probably intended persuade Communist faithful that:

1. Political vigor of revolutionary Communism will not die out in prolonged era of "peaceful coexistence."
2. New age of expansion of Soviet-Communist power will come in fullness of time.

12 May 1955

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PHILIPPINES

- I. Well into his ~~second~~ ^{second} year in office, Magsaysay has yet to deliver on most of his campaign promises, particularly reform program.
- A. His popularity with the people is still high but some disillusionment is apparent among intellectual circles and the press.
- B. He has simply not mastered the intricacies of Philippine politics.
- C. Current session of Philippine congress, which convened in February, will end on 18 May; to date, only one important bill enacted--approval of revised US trade agreement
- D. Now debating on "emergency employment plan" ^{apparently} cooked up by sugar interests ^{which} would authorize president to lower minimum wages and devalue currency.

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- E. Magsaysay concerned over unemployment
--although situation is about normal--
but says congressional plan would make
him feel like "wearing boots and
raincoat in sunny weather."
- F. Not many Philippine politicians much
interested in real reform.

II. Recto, the president's arch-enemy and party
colleague, is brainy as well as being an
astute politician.

- A. His barely concealed anti-Americanism
is not popular and he has not succeeded
in attracting a large following.
- B. But he knows how to grab headlines and
how to make anti-Americanism sound like
good Philippine nationalism.
- C. Such issues as the title to American
bases and alleged US wavering on Formosa
policy are made to order for him.

D. He has, however, backed down on repara-
tions claims against Japan; no longer
holding out for \$1 billion cash.

E. Filipinos and Japanese are still
negotiating and there is fair prospect
for early settlement.

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INDONESIAN PROSPECTS

- I. Indonesia's first national elections, 5-1/2 years after country's foundation, have at last been set for 29 September.
 - A. Voters will elect a national parliament (260 seats in single house) to replace present 233-man body, which came into being largely by appointment.
 - B. Although no less than 40 different political groups will seek voters' support, main issue will be choice between coalition government (such as present one) which accepts Communist support or one opposing both domestic and international Communism.
 - C. Results expected to be close but we estimate that--if elections honest--parties now in opposition should win enough seats to allow formation new coalition government.

II. September elections for parliament will

be first of two scheduled for '55.

Second, in December, will elect 520 to special assembly which will draft permanent Indonesian constitution. Many candidates will seek seats in both bodies.

A. Both elections have been repeatedly delayed [redacted]

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B. National Party (PNI), which has been in power past 19 months, is charged with ~~abetting such~~ delays, to gain time for strengthening its political machine.

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C. Opposition parties, obstructed by PNI tactics, suffering from traditional poverty of "outs," have lost ground.

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D. Communists, however, have made good use of delays to up membership, improve organization.

III. Of the more than 40 organizations registered, only four of primary significance.

A. Masjumi (Moslem Council)--moderate

Moslem organization, principal opposition party (present parliamentary strength: 17%).

1. As chief Moslem organization in predominantly Islamic nation, Masjumi looks to rural areas and lower classes for its vote and expects village religious leaders to deliver it.
2. Although earlier prediction had given Masjumi a chance for an absolute majority, it is now expected to win no more than 30-35 % of total vote (still plurality) and this only if elections are honest.

B. Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI: National Party)--the strongly nationalistic but opportunist party which leads present government (18%).

1. PNI strength comes from civil service, students, businessmen, other educated groups.
2. PNI expected to pool no more than 15-20 % of vote if elections honest.

C. Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI: Communist Party)--under leadership of Aidit (who has done tours with Ho Chi Minh, ChiComs and Soviets) PKI hold 7% of present parliament, controls a bloc of 8% more, including largest labor federation in Indonesia (SOBSI), such peasant organizations as Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI - Farmer's Union).

1. Other than Masjumi, PKI is only party with village organization.
2. PKI expected get 15-20% of honest vote.

D. Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: Renaissance of Learning)--a conservative anti-Communist Moslem party, which now holds such cabinet posts as Religion and Home Ministry.

1. Although supporting present government, NU is not committed for future, may line up with Masjumi after vote is in.

2. NU expected get 10%

E. Remaining 15-30% of vote will be scattered among minor contenders.

1. Most significant of these--since in opposition--are Socialist Party (PSI), Catholic Party (PKRI), and Christian Party (PARKINDO).

2. Collectively, these three may get 10-15%.

IV. Both sexes, over age 18 (or younger, if married) eligible to vote (estimated 50-60 million of total 79 million population).

- A. Electorate inexperienced, 80% illiterate.
- B. Parties therefore putting pictographs, as well as names, on ballots: crescent and star for Masjumi; buffalo head in triangle for PNI; usual hammer and sickle for PKI; star-studded hemisphere for NU.
- C. PSI, although doing little electioneering, is compounding confusion by using seven different symbols.
- D. Masjumi ~~reported~~ busy in villages, teaching illiterates how to select crescent and star from among more than 40 competitors.
- V. Meanwhile, Government is trying obstruct, intimidate opposition--particularly Masjumi.
 - A. Masjumi candidates have been arrested on trumped-up charges of association with dissident Moslem extremists.

**B. Another Government tactic is refusal
time on Government radio (only one)
to any of opposition parties, while
making air free to PNI, others in
coalition.**

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**C. Government rigging of elections
therefore, cannot be discounted**

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12 May 1955

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INDONESIAN ELECTION ISSUES

- I. Principal issues are three--colonialism,
capitalism, communism.
 - A. All parties demand "return" of Nether-
lands New Guinea (colonial issue).
 - B. PNI and Communists, with help of
President Sukarno, demand destruction
of "economic imperialism," i.e.,
nationalization of foreign investment
in order to "complete Indonesian inde-
pendence" (capitalism issue).
- II. As to communism issue, Sukarno and PNI
are talking up fuzzy philosophy called
"Marhaenism" (incorporated in PNI election
symbol).
 - A. This is philosophy of "brotherhood,"
with strong Marxian overtones, expected
to appeal to people who otherwise
would turn to Islam or Communism.

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B. Masjumi takes anti-Communist, pro-God-and-country approach.

1. Brands communism as sinful.
2. Also opposes rapid nationalization,
on grounds it will increase economic
problems.

C. NU shares Masjumi's forthright anti-
Communist position.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

- I. Diem installed new government, on 10 May, to jump the gun on any recommendation coming out of US-French meetings in Paris.
 - A. New cabinet (14 men) consists mainly of capable, non-party but nationalist technicians; includes three Cao Dai representatives.
 - B. Diem holds that "broadening" of government along lines urged by French would mean embracing men whose sole aim would be destroy him
 - C. Fact that no posts in new cabinet allotted to Revolutionary Council indicates Diem's determination not to be dominated by that group
 - D. Diem apparently willing to wait for a national assembly to oust Bao Dai and will work for early election of such a body.

II. Diem wants French Expeditionary Corps

withdrawn soonest possible.

- A. He sees it as instrument of French intrigue.
- B. Would be satisfied for present if French forces were moved out of Saigon, deployed mainly on 17th parallel;
- C. Demarcation line now patrolled only by Vietnamese, closest French units are at Tourane.
- D. Phased withdrawal of French forces would ~~provide~~ considerable political capital ~~to~~ Vietnamese government.

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III. Meanwhile

popular support for Diem in areas of central Vietnam from which Viet Minh now withdrawing.

- A. Even simplest peasant
 could give brief background history of premier.
- B. Pro-Diem demonstrations in several towns appeared spontaneous.

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IV. Binh Xuyen remnants and Hoa Hao forces still giving army some trouble in the South.

- A. Binh Xuyen has retreated to its old hangouts in swampy areas between Saigon and the coast where they are able to cut the road to Cap St. Jacques.
- B. Terrain is such that complete destruction will be hard job.
- C. Hoa Hao units, southwest of Saigon, continue intermittent attacks on government posts.

12 May 1955

SOUTH VIETNAM

According to the press French and US officials reached a 5-point agreement in Paris. The 5 points are: (1) Bao should remain as nominal head of state but stay in France; (2) Diem should widen his cabinet; (3) elections should be held as soon as possible; (4) the US should use its influence on Diem to halt anti-French propaganda; (5) the FEC should be progressively withdrawn.

Saigon reports state that Diem will ask Paris either to move the FEC to the demarcation line or to withdraw it.

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NSC Briefing

12 May 55

INDIAN STEEL MILL

- I. Present Indian steel plants call for a production goal of 6 million tons of ingots by 1961. This goal is to be reached, according to the Planning Commission as follows:
- ^{Tata} increase TISCO to two million tons;
 - ^{Bhilai} increase IISCO to one million tons;
 - increase Rourkela to one million tons.
 - Russian plant one million tons
 - British plant one million tons.

Most observers agree that 4.5 million tons of steel capacity by 1961 would be a more realistic goal. The Indians apparently accepted the Soviet steel proposal for two reasons: (1) It would give [^]steel plants [^]a semblance of neutrality i.e., offers were

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accepted from the Soviet Bloc and the West.

(2) The Soviets were offering them good
economic terms.

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AFGHAN DILEMMA

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I. Pak ultimatum to Afghanistan, this Sunday,
15 May.

A. Ultimatum states if Afghanistan does
not make full "restitution" by that
date (for 30 March looting of Pak
embassy in Kabul), Paks will take
"necessary measures."

B. Pak Interior Minister Mirza says
"measures" may include rupture of
diplomatic relations, economic blockade.

C. Blockade would cut Afghan's normal
route to sea, force any international
trade to use bad and roundabout routes
via Iran or USSR.

II. For Afghans to make required "restitution"
would mean serious loss of face. However,
even larger problem has been raised by Pak
hints to Afghan Government that Prime Min-
ister Daud should be removed from office.

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- A. Almost unanimous foreign diplomatic opinion that 30 Mar riots were government-inspired. Daud probably personally responsible.
- B. Daud also chief proponent of "Pushtoonistan" campaign, major bone of Afghan-Pak contention.
- C. Additionally, is suspect because he favors closer economic relations with USSR.

III. Dilemma is that Afghan royal family cannot gracefully remove Daud.

- A. Aware that "Pushtoonistan" campaign has had no foreign support for past 7 years, except from India--and even India now expressing concern over trend of events.
- B. Also aware of widespread popular criticism inside Afghanistan and abroad over Daud's economic policy towards USSR

C. Family probably would prefer to retain Daud, if it could get his acquiescence to "restitution" and to cutting down on Pushtoonistan propaganda and Soviet economic ties.

1. No readily acceptable replacement or alternate employment for Daud.
2. Also difficult to discipline for third time in recent years the man who probably will assume control of country in near future

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D. However, Daud apparently unwilling to acquiesce; has decided to use current crisis to make bid for complete control of government.

E. Thus, royal family faced with two horns--get rid of Daud or surrender to him completely.

IV. All recent Afghan actions designed to delay need grasp one or other these horns.

A. Afghan now engaged in frantic diplomatic maneuvering designed to alarm other countries, encourage them to ask Paks ease pressure. Maneuvers include: blaming Pakistan for current crisis; broadcasting inflammatory propaganda re Pak burning of holy Koran; mobilizing armed forces (4 May) and stating willingness fight Pak if necessary; threatening to turn to USSR in case of economic blockade; requesting US mediation, discussing possible Turkish and Saudi intervention.

B. Despite brave front, alarming nature
some Afghan threats, most this byplay
seems bluff.

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C. Royal family aware of both Afghan military weakness vis-a-vis Pak and complete failure to enlist foreign support.

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VI. Mediation seems unlikely accomplish real
solution to dispute since Egypt, Saudi, Iran
unlikely put heavy pressure on Afghanistan.
A. Further delay may therefore merely strengthen
Daud and postpone final decision.